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31. Foreword 
Welcome to the third and penultimate Big Potential Advanced (BPA) Evaluation report, which covers 
performance to the end of December 2017.
With all the funding now allocated, this year’s report gives insight into the effectiveness of the 
programme through a profile of the Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise (VCSE) organisations 
that were awarded funding for their business support. It also looks at how this translates into improved 
states of investment and contract readiness, and ultimately to deals and contracts.
We’ve come a long way since BPA was launched in 2015 offering grants to VCSEs seeking business 
support funding to help gain more than £500,000 of social investment or a contract in excess of £1 
million. The programme launched in a tough and testing climate for charities and social enterprises: with 
competition for contracts high, and growing pressure on trading organisations in their markets. The high 
demand for support at the closure of the programme also demonstrates how important programmes of 
this kind have proven to be for organisations within the sector.
This is why it’s encouraging to see the successes documented here: of course, as more organisations 
have completed their projects, it’s no surprise to see more successful outcomes being reported than in 
previous evaluations: and there is every expectation that there will be more to come. We’re very proud 
of the overall performance to date. Nearly £10 million of grants have been awarded and that support 
has helped 38 VCSEs achieve nearly £460 million of investment and contracts.
It remains important to say that such success is down to all the participants in the programme – 
primarily the VCSES (both successful and unsuccessful), providers, investment panel members, 
investors and commissioners. Many of those have again contributed generously and invaluably with 
their time and observations to this evaluation as in previous years, for which we are hugely thankful.
Evaluations like this one are essential not only to understand why and how success is achieved, but 
also to learn from and to inform future work. Social Investment Business and Big Lottery Fund are both 
committed to being open about that learning and how we can all improve and we will be absorbing the 
learning from this report as much as anyone. It is crucial that we all seek to find the most effective ways 
to support those organisations who are changing people’s lives and improving communities in some of 
the toughest parts of the country: if we can help them do more and do better, and be more resilient, we 
will move closer to a fairer economy and a more vibrant society. 
Nick Temple 
Chief Executive 
Social Investment Business  
Gemma Rocyn Jones 
Head of Finance Resilience 
Big Lottery Fund
42. Overview
Big Potential Advanced (BPA), was launched 
in January 2015 as a £10 million expansion to 
the Big Potential Programme in addition to the 
existing £10 million Big Potential Breakthrough 
(BPB). The market for investment and contract 
readiness provision is steadily being built, 
and there is significant evidence from the 
Investment and Contract Readiness Fund 
(ICRF) of improved capabilities which will lead 
to investment or contract wins (Ecorys, October 
2015)1. BPA intended to build upon the learning 
generated through the operation of the ICRF 
programme with a concerted focus on the 
social impact generated through investment and 
contract readiness programmes.
BPA sought to support the more developed 
sections of the Voluntary, Community and 
Social Enterprise (VCSE) sector to access social 
investment (amounts larger than £500,000) 
and/or large public service delivery contracts 
(in excess of £1 million). The VCSEs that BPA 
supported were envisaged to be much more 
‘investment and contract ready’ than those that 
applied to BPB and to be closer to securing 
investment or contracts. Therefore, whilst 
BPB sought to improve the sustainability, 
capacity and scale of VCSEs; BPA aimed to 
provide the final ‘push’ of support needed by 
more established organisations to win social 
investment and contracts, by assisting them 
to improve their capabilities in areas deemed 
critical to investors and commissioners. 
The £10 million BPA support package was 
provided through grant funding of up to 
£150,000 and was used to support VCSE costs 
(maximum of 40% of the grant) and bring in 
expert external providers as consultants. VCSE 
applicants were expected to already have a 
1 The ICRF was a £10m Cabinet Office funded scheme that operated 
between May 2012 and March 2015 and sought to develop the 
investment and contract readiness of VCSEs seeking social investment 
and/or public sector contracts.
clear vision of how social investment would 
allow them to achieve their goals and to have 
identified potential interested investors and/or 
contracts that they could compete for. Crucially, 
whilst the funding could not be used to cover the 
costs of core staff members, it could be used to 
provide backfill for these staff whilst they work 
on the investment and/or contract deal, and to 
extend the working hours of part-time staff to 
assist with this. The core outcomes aimed at by 
BPA were:
• To support the highest potential social 
ventures to develop the key capabilities 
required to secure investment and/or 
contracts.
• To improve the sustainability of the 
investment and contract readiness support 
marketplace.
• To increase market-wide understanding 
(investors; providers; commissioners; policy-
makers; funders; VCSEs) of the needs of the 
VCSE sector in securing large investment 
and contracts and of how best to support 
these needs.
The BPA programme was developed from a 
robust theory of change that described the 
starting points and learning gained from ICRF 
and how BPA would build upon these. In 
addition, the theory of change described how 
BPA would achieve these new aims and what 
the specific outputs and overall outcomes of 
the programme would be in order to achieve the 
overall mission of supporting VCSEs to secure 
more investment and contracts. Figure 2.1 
overleaf provides an overview of this theory  
of change2.
2 This Theory of Change was developed by the BPA team (SIB and 
partners) at the outset of the programme. This ToC was then 
subsequently utilised by the evaluation team in the design of our 
research tools.
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social impact
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to receive social 
investment
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another investment 
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readiness plan
VCSEs are 
resourced to deliver 
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beginning their 
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firm investment 
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partners and other 
stakeholders
VCSEs don’t think 
social investment is 
for them
VCSEs expectations 
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Investment 
readiness 
programmes are 
poorly coordinated 
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VCSEs expectations 
of what it takes 
to be investment 
ready doesn’t 
match the 
expectations of 
investors
VCSEs expectations 
of a sound 
revenue model 
doesn’t match the 
expectations of 
investors
Many VCSEs lack 
sufficiently good 
financial acumen
VCSEs struggle to 
access Payment by 
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without being 
able to secure 
investment
Up to 70,000 
VCSEs could 
demand social 
investment
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Figure 2.1 - 
Big Potential: 
Our theory  
of change
6The BPA programme was launched by the 
Big Lottery Fund and was delivered by Social 
Investment Business (SIB). The University of 
Northampton is the ongoing evaluation partner 
for the fund and the evaluation has been based 
upon the theory of change previously outlined3. 
The BPA Programme had five distinct phases: 
online registration by VCSEs and providers; the 
VCSE’s selection of a provider and together 
with the provider, working up an application for 
grant; submission of the grant application by 
the VCSE; consideration of applications by the 
BPA panel; and the provider undertaking post-
grant work with the VCSE for which the grant 
was awarded. Unlike BPB, BPA did not have the 
online diagnostic tool or the 1:1 support advisor 
sessions, instead moving from online registration 
to immediately selecting and working with a 
support provider on the grant application. The 
VCSEs that engaged with BPA were envisaged 
to be larger and more developed than their BPB 
3 Whilst BPA has now closed to grant applications, the evaluation 
continues as the research seeks to track VCSEs up to 12 months 
post-grant award. The evaluation’s data gathering will therefore close 
in autumn 2018.
counterparts (and closer to being investment 
and contract ready), and therefore were not 
deemed to require an in-depth pre-application 
assessment process.
Following registration for BPA the VCSE 
applicant selected a support provider from an 
approved list to work with, to co-develop their 
grant application. The grant application was 
submitted following a period of work with the 
provider and the BPA panel then considered 
whether the application should be successful, 
be rejected or whether it should be revised and 
resubmitted. If rejected the VCSE could reapply. 
If successful, the VCSE was awarded the grant 
funding and began work with their support 
provider to develop its investment and contract 
readiness in order to secure social investment in 
excess of £500,000 or a contract in excess of £1 
million. These five phases are outlined below in 
Figure 2.2.
RESUBMITSELECT PROVIDER
POST-GRANT 
ICR WORK
SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT/ 
CONTRACT
SUMBIT  
APPLICATION
PANEL 
DECISION
INELIGIBLE
ONLINE  
REGISTRATION
REJECT
SIGNPOSTED  
ELSEWHERE
Figure 2.2 – Five Phases of BPA
7This paper represents the third annual evaluation 
report for BPA covering the full three years of 
operation up to December 31st 2017 (the grant 
awards phase of BPA closed in October 2017). 
It provides an overview of the effectiveness of 
the programme, the broad types of VCSEs that 
are seeking BPA support and how this support 
is translating into increased investment and 
contract readiness as well as ‘deal flow’. The 
research uses the demographic data obtained 
from VCSE applicants at the online registration 
phase as well as in their grant applications, 
and also uses interview data that was gathered 
by the evaluation team from VCSE applicants 
(successful and unsuccessful); commissioners, 
social investors; providers; panel members; and 
policy-makers. Now that the BPA has completed 
its grant award phase, the data gathered 
provides a rounded overview of the impact of the 
programme on VCSEs and the wider investment 
and contract readiness sector, as investment 
and contract deals are secured. However, the 
data gathering process will be continuing until all 
of the grant monitoring processes are completed 
(12 months post-grant), so that the longitudinal 
impact of BPA can be fully assessed.
83. Executive Summary
3.1 Evaluation method & approach
The data contained in this research reflects 
the performance of BPA up to December 
31st 2017. A mixed-methods approach to 
data collection was adopted that involved the 
collection of quantitative and qualitative data. 
The quantitative data (from 231 VCSEs4) was 
collected through the online application process, 
grant applications and panel considerations 
and feedback documentation. This involved the 
capturing of organisational data (i.e. sector of 
operation, organisational reach, financial data, 
staffing levels, product details, and investment 
and/or contract needs). Data related to the 
longitudinal impact of BPA on social impact and 
its measurement was also captured through 
SIB’s Methodology for Impact Analysis and 
Assessment (MIAA) tool, completed by SIB at 
the beginning of a VCSE’s BPA journey (Time 1), 
and again 12 months’ post-grant (Time 2) (data 
related to 133 VCSEs at Time 1 and 37 VCSEs at 
Time 2). 
The qualitative data was collected in the form of 
39 semi-structured interviews from the following 
participants5:
• twenty VCSEs:
 - thirteen successful
 - three VCSEs had secured 
investment
 - one VCSE had secured a contract 
4 23 VCSEs in Year 1; 113 VCSEs in Year 2; 95 VCSEs in Year 3. It should 
be noted that whilst SIB received 248 grant applications to BPA in total, 
17 of these were resubmissions, hence the total number of VCSEs  
was 231.
5 See Appendix A for a full methodological overview.
 - two VCSEs had completed their 
grant with no investment and/or 
contract secured
 - seven VCSEs were all at  
different stages of their post-grant 
award phase
 - four unsuccessful VCSEs
 - three VCSE that were rejected, but then 
successfully reapplied
• seven provider organisations
• five panel members
• four investors
• one commissioner. 
3.2 Research Findings
Over the first three years of BPA the following 
outputs have been achieved:
• 231 grant applications received and 17 
resubmissions:
 - 99 investment applications; 
 - 96 contract applications; 
 - 36 investment and contract applications.
• Of these 231 applications 1376 grant awards 
were made (59% success rate):
 - average value of £70,000; 
 - 64 x contract; 56 x investment; 17 x 
investment/contract;
 - one of the above grant offers was 
declined by the VCSE; 
 - 94 were rejected.
6 136 grant awards were made in the end, as one VCSE declined the 
grant award offer.
9• As of December 31st 2017, 10 investments 
(value of £15.2m) and 30 contracts (value 
of £444m) had been won by 38 VCSE grant 
awardees, with still only 62% of VCSEs 
being 12 months’ post-grant award.
Amongst these 231 grant applications the VCSE 
demographics demonstrated the following 
profile:
• average turnover of £2.1m.
• low profitability rate on that turnover of 
1.9%; 
• equivalent of 33 FTE 1.0 staff.
• average age of 13 years.
• seeking investment and/or contracts of £2m 
and £2.2m respectively.
• The programme received significantly lower 
numbers of  applications from the following 
3 regions compared to the other 6 regions7: 
 - East Midlands (-3.5%); 
 - East of England (-5.3%);
 - West Midlands (-2.5%)
• 71.7% of the VCSE applicants operated 
on at least a regional basis in their service 
provision. 
• Nearly two-thirds of applicants were 
Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLGs):
 - 78% of applicants have social purpose 
built into their legal and governance 
structures. 
• Finally, nearly two-thirds of the applicant 
VCSEs operated in employment, training 
and education, and/or in: housing and local 
facilities, mental health and wellbeing, and 
citizenship and community.
7 The negative values represent the amount that applications are below 
the national proportion of VCSEs for each region.
In addition, the qualitative data has 
demonstrated that:
• Many VCSE applicants are using existing 
provider relationships when applying to BPA. 
• Panel feedback on applications was 
generally considered detailed and helpful by 
providers and VCSEs. 
• Contract readiness applications have a 67% 
success rate compared with an investment 
readiness application rate of 55%.
• The performance of BPA in the post-grant 
phase and the impact delivered appears 
strong, now that nearly two-thirds of VCSEs 
are more than 12 months’ post-grant. The 
data reveals that:
 - VCSEs have the ‘ability’ and ‘willingness’ 
to work with Providers on applications 
and post-grant in investment/contract 
applications, but not the capacity. This 
is where BPA has significant impact 
in leveraging in this capacity through 
consultants. 
 - Post-grant work has mainly focused 
on: market potential (104 of the 137 
awardees and 27% of all support 
requests); and quality and impact (97 
of the 137 awardees and 25% of all 
support requests).
• Stakeholders viewed the potential impact 
of BPA on the investment and contract 
readiness state of the VCSE sector and 
social investment market positively, as BPA:
 - Provides key support around: 
organisational development (governance 
and management); business planning; 
financial modelling; public sector tender 
response and bid writing; contract 
management; legal issues; and social 
impact measurement
 - Provides support for the development of 
the provider market; 
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 - Enables VCSEs to access this provider 
support;
 - Brings commercial consultants into the 
third sector marketplace.
 - Has created considerable deal-flow 
now, especially in relation to Contract 
Readiness (CR).
• A number of minor negative points were also 
made by the interviewees (who were VCSEs, 
providers and panel members), including: 
 - the high daily rate of Providers; 
 - Provider quality.
 - Panel decisions not always having as 
much open discussion as might be 
necessary.
 - Lack of flexibility in the grant to allow for 
multiple Provider use by the VCSE8. 
3.3 Recommendations
Whilst it is no longer practical to make 
recommendations as the BPA programme 
has now completed its grant making, wider 
recommendations for Investment Readiness 
(IR) and CR programmes can be gleaned 
from the data gathered to date, along with the 
performance of the BPA so far. These are:
1. VCSE Engagement: There remain 
entrenched regional engagement problems 
in relation to the East of England, the East 
Midlands and the West Midlands. This has 
been the case on both BPA and BPB (for the 
East of England and East Midlands) albeit 
BPA has had a higher level of engagement 
from the East of England than BPB (BPA = 
-5.3% versus BPB = -8.2% when compared 
with national averages). These regions have 
also historically been hard to reach for other 
8 As has been noted, these statements represent the perceptions of 
VCSEs. BPA did in fact allow for the utilisation of multiple Providers 
where the case could be made, but clearly this was a factor that some 
VCSEs were not aware of (and it could be argued some Providers 
might not overtly market this).
funding programmes. Wider ecosystem 
development is required in these regions if 
future funding programmes are to succeed 
(the North East provides an interesting case 
study of how infrastructure improvements 
can lead to improved engagement and 
deal flow, at least in relation to IR). This 
ecosystem development might include the 
following three core interventions:
a. Creation of VCSE owned/led 
networks within regions to promote 
communication and sharing of best 
practice.
b. Hubs of investors and support 
consultancies in major regional cities (as 
we have seen in Newcastle and Bristol, 
and to a degree Manchester).
c. Support from Local Government for 
the VCSE sector. Whilst in the current 
climate this might not include funding, 
other mechanisms such as policy, 
procurement/commissioning, and local 
enterprise engagement would  
be helpful.
2. Post-grant impact: Future programmes 
should consider additional types of grant or 
sub-grant that provides support to VCSEs 
after they have secured investment (but 
before the drawdown of funds) or following 
the securing of a contract. This additional 
funding support could be crucial in helping 
VCSEs make sustainable transitions to 
new business models or project delivery 
frameworks. Furthermore, monitoring and 
research should be extended beyond the 
18 months’ (monitoring) and 12 months 
(research) post-grant that is currently in 
place, to at least two years as it is clear 
that significant impacts are generally not 
felt over time periods of 12-18 months. This 
would likely have to be the responsibility of 
the Fund rather than the VCSE, due to the 
burdens already on VCSEs. However, VCSEs 
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have a responsibility here to engage in data 
capture and actively report this back, an 
area that has not necessarily been the case 
on BPA or BPB.
3. Provider Quality: A number of stakeholders 
have articulated a desire to see more done 
to assess the quality of Providers, perhaps 
through an online platform that can be used 
by VCSEs to assess Provider performance, 
and by Providers to market their skills. 
This would also act as a networking space 
between the two stakeholder groups as 
well. VCSE and Provider fit was broadly 
articulated on the basis of Provider culture fit 
and understanding of the VCSE, as opposed 
to any technical skills deficit. VCSEs were 
also keen to know how proactive Providers 
were in the grant application phase and what 
their success rates were.
4. Wider ecosystem: There are clearly 
significant impacts on VCSE IR/CR 
journeys from wider ecosystem factors (e.g.  
unexplained commissioner behaviour; legal 
problems; ‘investability’ and why deals don’t 
happen; affordability of social investment; 
and VCSE risk-aversion). In some respects, 
it is difficult for grant funding programmes to 
counter these, but awareness of the factors 
in the design of future programmes may 
help. In this respect there was a general 
desire amongst participants across the 
three years to see a BPA2 programme. 
Programme features that may assist with 
these wider ecosystem issues as articulated 
by VCSEs/Providers are:
a. Post-win funding: Grant funding being 
allowed to be allocated to the post-
investment/contract win, to help deal 
with capacity issues and the various 
problems that can occur after securing 
investment but before drawing-down the 
money.
b. Subsidy of Investment: Where there 
are issues of investment affordability, 
grant funding programmes could seek to 
offset some of the due-diligence costs 
(or directly subsidise products through 
blended deals) to improve affordability. 
The hope here would be that as the 
market grew and investor experience 
with it, innovative products and more 
affordable deals due to the increasing 
amounts of recycled capital, would 
begin to emerge.
c. VCSEs need to be supported/educated 
to take on some of the responsibility 
for this themselves, in researching the 
market and understanding the common 
problems that can arise, so as to be able 
to mitigate them as best as possible.
BPA has clearly performed well, with nearly 
£10m of grants awarded/offered to VCSEs. This 
grant support has to date leveraged in nearly 
£460 million of investment and contracts, across 
38 VCSEs and 40 ‘deals’9. It will be interesting 
to see how these figures increase as the 52 
remaining VCSE grant awardees who are not 
yet 12 months’ post-grant, progress in Year 4. It 
seems that the impact intended to be delivered 
by BPA is now starting to emerge.
9 As has been noted in the main report, this figure is somewhat skewed 
by the large contract win of one VCSE of £220m.
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The data gathered to date in the form of VCSE 
demographic data, grant applications, panel 
considerations, grant decisions and feedback, 
as well as the qualitative interview data gathered 
are presented in this section in relation to the 
different stages of BPA. Whilst there are five 
distinct phases to BPA as outlined earlier in 
figure 2.2, for the purposes of the evaluation 
these have been condensed into three key 
stages: registration and provider working; grant 
application and panel feedback; and post-
grant development. A section on the wider 
sector impact of BPA is also included at the 
end of the results section. The quantitative 
and qualitative data gathered will be presented 
jointly in each section where applicable, so as 
to provide triangulated support to the emergent 
findings discussed. As was noted earlier, all 
the quantitative data presented in this section 
relates to BPA performance to December 31st 
2017, whilst the qualitative data relates to 
VCSEs that had at the minimum received their 
grant application decisions from the panel. 
The interview data from other stakeholders 
represents their views on the various stages of 
the programme that they were involved in (e.g. 
panel members and the panel decision-making 
processes) and/or their opinions of the wider 
efficacy and impact of BPA to date.
4.1 – VCSE Demographics
In the three years of the programme 231 
BPA grant applications were received from 
VCSEs seeking support (23 VCSEs in Year 1; 
113 VCSEs in Year 2; 95 VCSEs in Year 3)10. 
Data was captured from these in relation to; 
10 It should be noted that whilst SIB received 248 grant applications to 
BPA in total, 17 of these were resubmissions, hence the total number 
of VCSEs was 231.
sector of operation, geographic location and 
reach, organisational age, staffing, turnover 
and profitability. This section will explore the 
demographic base of BPA applicants in relation 
to these variables, as well as their perceptions of 
the registration phase and the provider selection 
and working phase in preparing the grant 
application. In addition, provider perceptions 
of this element of the programme are also 
presented in order that both organisational 
perspectives are accounted for. Figure 4.2 below 
provides an overview of the organisational 
demographics of applicants.
Figure 4.2 –  
BPA Applicant Demographics
Nb. See Appendix B for the full statistical breakdown.
4. Results
33 FULL TIME STAFF
20 PART TIME STAFF
15 VOLUNTEERS
AGE 13 YEARS
INVESTMENT  
SOUGHT £2M
CONTRACT 
SOUGHT £2.2M
TURNOVER £2,1M
PROFITS £39,000
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The data outlined previously in figure 4.2 
outlines the average demographic data-points 
captured for VCSE applicants to BPA. The data 
reveals that VCSE turnover has dropped slightly 
overall for the programme at £2.09 million11. 
Overall, average profit levels for the VCSEs has 
decreased from £52,000 across the first two 
years, to £39,000 (1.9% of turnover) over the 
three years [Year 1 = £36,000 (2.8%); Year 2 = 
£63,000 (2.3%); Year 3 = £36,000 (1.7%)]. As 
with Years 1 and 2 the organisations were well 
established (average age of 13 years), with 33 
FTE staff (Year 1 = 24 FTE staff; Year 2 = 39 
FTE staff; Year 3 = 26 FTE staff) and a relatively 
low reliance on volunteers. Nevertheless, the 
sums of investment and/or contracts that were 
being sought were high in comparison with 
turnover (investment = 95.7% of turnover; 
contracts = 105.3% of turnover), suggesting 
that VCSEs were looking to significantly expand 
their operations. As with the findings reported 
across the first two years, it also suggests that 
VCSE applicants to the BPA are small-sized 
SMEs seeking to rapidly scale. Finally, whilst 
the level of investment sought dropped slightly 
(£2m across the three years compared to £2.2m 
across the first two years), the overall value 
of contracts sought (£2.2m) remained broadly 
similar in comparison to previous years (Year 1 
= £2.7m; Year 2 = £2.1m; Year 3 = £2m). This 
means that VCSEs are seeking four times the 
level of investment that is the minimum for  
BPA (£500,000) and 2.2x the minimum contract 
value (£1m).
In relation to the geographical engagement of 
BPA throughout the English regions, figure 4.3 
details BPA applicant’s locations.
11 Broken down this is as follows: Year 1 = £1.3 million; Year 2 = £2.74 
million; Year 3 = £1.64 million.
Figure 4.3 – BPA Applicants by Region
Figure 4.3 above shows that over one-quarter of 
the 231 BPA applicants were based in London; 
with London, the South East and the South West 
accounting for 53.1% of all applications. The 
other main geographic regions engaging with 
BPA are the North West (10.9%) Yorkshire and 
Humber (9.1%); the North East (7.8%) and East 
of England. 
In comparison with the average regional 
percentage of voluntary sector organisations 
as a proportion of the national total (see the 
2016 NCVO data below in Table 4.1), the only 
regions that appear to be significantly under-
represented are the East Midlands (-3.5%), the 
East of England (-5.3%) and the West Midlands 
(-2.5%) (NCVO, 2016). The BPA is broadly 
aligned with national averages elsewhere and 
surpasses these averages with high engagement 
London
South East
South West
East of England
East Midlands
West Midlands
Yorkshire  
and Humber
North East
North West
15.2%
9.6%
7.8%
28.3%
5.2%
10.9%
9.1%
7.8%
6.1%
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in London (+10%); Yorkshire and Humber (+1.4%); the North East (+4.4%); and the North West (+0.9%). 
Compared with previous years, engagement in Year 3 was higher than the BPA overall averages in: 
London (+3.6%); South East (+0.8%); East Midlands (+3.3%); West Midlands (+0.3%); and the North 
West (+2.9%). Applications were reduced in: South West (-3.2%); East of England (-2.5%); Yorkshire 
and Humber (-3.8%); and the North East (-1.4%).
Table 4.1 – VCSE Regional Applications
Region BPA year one BPA year two BPA year three BPA Overall National Average
London 21.7% 26.5% 31.9% 28.3% 18.3%
South East 8.0% 15.9% 16.0% 15.2% 18.5%
South West 4.4% 13.3% 6.4% 9.6% 12.9%
East of England 13.0% 8.8% 5.3% 7.8% 12.5%
East Midlands 8.0% 1.8% 8.5% 5.2% 8.1%
West Midlands 4.4% 6.2% 6.4% 6.1% 8.6%
Yorkshire  
& Humber 17.4% 10.6% 5.3% 9.1% 7.7%
North East 8.0% 8.8% 6.4% 7.8% 3.4%
North West 13.0% 8.0% 13.8% 10.9% 10.0%
Nb. National average data taken from NCVO Almanac (2016). Items highlighted in green represent regions where engagement is above the national average;  
in yellow represents engagement up to 25% lower than the national average; in red represents engagement more than 25% below the national average.
Data about the geographic reach relating to their services was also captured from BPA applicants. 
Figure 4.4 below outlines these findings.
Figure 4.4 – VCSE Geographic Reach
Nb. See Appendix C for the full statistical breakdown.
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Figure 4.4 demonstrates the continuing trend 
seen in Years 1 and 2 in which the focus of the 
fund on more established and larger VCSEs 
meant that there were no applicants with a 
purely neighbourhood focus. However, there 
was an increased number of overall applications 
(27.3%) from VCSEs that operated merely in 
their local authority area compared with Years 
1 and 2 (Year 1 = 13%; Year 2 = 28.3%; Year 
3 = 29.3%). Applications from regional and 
multi-regional VCSEs were slightly lower when 
compared to Year 2 at 52.1%. Now that BPA has 
completed the grant awards phase, it is clear to 
see that the programme has offered support to 
local and regional VCSEs in the main (68.8%). 
Data about organisational type was also 
captured from the VCSE applicants and figure 
4.5 below provides an outline of this data.
Figure 4.5 –  
Legal Organisational Structure
Nb. See Appendix D for the full satistical breakdown.
Figure 4.5 identifies that nearly two-thirds of BPA 
applicants are Companies Limited by Guarantee 
(CLG), with only 15.4% being Community 
Interest Companies (CIC). However, 85.1% of the 
CLG applicants are CLGs with charitable status, 
which means that 78% of VCSE applicants to 
the BPA have a social purpose built into their 
legal structure through either assets locks 
(Charities and CICs) or community ownership 
(IPS). In Year 3, the diversity of legal forms 
amongst applicants drastically dropped, with 
84.6% of VCSEs being CLG/Community Interest 
Company Limited by Guarantee (CIC-G), and 
the remainder being ‘Other’ organisational types 
(12.1%) or Companies Limited by Share (3.3%). 
However, for the entirety of the programme it can 
be identified from the data that the vast majority 
of applicants had clearly defined social purposes 
within their legal organisational structures  
(as would be the intention when targeting the 
VCSE sector). 
  Unincorporated
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Finally, data related to sector of operation was 
also captured. Figure 4.6 below details this.
Figure 4.6 – VCSE Sector of Operation
Nb. See Appendix E for the full statistical breakdown.
Figure 4.6 shows that the largest sector 
of operation for applicant VCSEs is the 
employment, training and education. Indeed, 
66.2% of the applicant VCSEs operated here 
and/or in housing and local facilities, mental 
health and wellbeing, and citizenship and 
community.
Once the VCSE applicants have registered for 
BPA they then begin the process of provider 
selection and then working with the provider 
to develop their application. As was identified 
in Years 1 and 2, the majority of the VCSE 
interviewees had previously worked with their 
Provider (including on ICRF; and the Mutuals 
Support Programme); and it was this relationship 
that had brought them to the BPA. Whilst in 
some cases this did not prevent the VCSEs from 
also interviewing other Provider organisations, 
the shared history, values and often sector 
alignment were seen as important in giving them 
the confidence that they could make the BPA 
journey a successful one12 with their chosen 
Provider. Indeed, in Year 3 this remained the 
same, with personal networks and links to 
Providers being characteristic in the Provider 
selection process.
One of our trustees knew them 
[Provider]…so she knew them and 
they were on the list for BPA when we were 
looking, so they were known to people in 
the organisation, but [VCSE Name] hadn’t 
worked with them before.  
(P31 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
Other VCSEs identified with the theme identified 
in the Year 2 report of Providers, their work, and 
the grant funding that pays for it not being the 
‘silver bullet’ to success for VCSEs in becoming 
IR or CR. One VCSE argued that it was a difficult 
process to go through in that they were not 
sure whether the Provider they had selected 
would turn out to be the right one for them or 
not, but that they then had to give significant 
proportions of the grant to them for the work. 
12 As with previous reports, a recurring theme to emerge from the data 
is the notion of what success constitutes on BPA, which is not always 
necessarily viewed by different stakeholders as being investment and 
contract wins. This will be explored throughout this report.
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This VCSE argued that the option to utilise 
multiple Providers (or consultants) as they saw 
fit would give them maximum flexibility in getting 
the support that they needed.
I was never really convinced that 
the silver bullet would be the Provider, and 
there was this weird double-edged sword 
in that I wasn’t sure whether they were 
the right guys, but then why do we have to 
give them so much of the funding? I would 
much rather say ask for £150k of funding 
to deliver a 12-month programme…where 
we bring in different advisors as we see 
fit, depending on what we need help with.   
(P37 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
Two VCSEs, who were ultimately successful 
in securing a grant, also bemoaned what they 
argued was a non-collaborative culture between 
VCSEs and grant funders, and that the journey 
should be one that was more coproduced and 
personal, rather than being based on online 
forms and emails. This was based both in 
relation to the application itself, and also the 
time allocation that they argued was involved in 
preparing the application13.
The [application] process needs to 
be more of a conversation, it’s really, 
really, hard to read between the lines of 
what the funder is actually looking for…
the recommended time to spend on the 
application is 20 days I think, 15-20 days, 
which is obviously a huge amount of time 
for a tiny organisation like ours that are 
busy running our own operation. 
(P37 – Unsuccessful VCSE) 
13 It should be noted that SIB makes no recommendation on the time 
required to complete an application.
There is always this thing with grant 
funding, it’s always about them 
and us, and I don’t think that is a healthy 
environment to be in. So for example, if 
there was some paperwork that needed 
completing, and I understand that grant 
funders have to be detailed and particular 
and everything has to be accurate, but our 
finance lady in the office, she was scared 
stiff that she’d made mistakes, and I think 
the tone of emails and the communication 
methods that Big Potential adopted wasn’t 
healthy. So yes we are grateful that there 
was some money, but we felt…at their beck 
and call, and that shouldn’t be the case. If a 
grant is there to support an organisation the 
support should be broader than just 
money. (P33 – Successful VCSE)
Finally, an investor and panel member articulated 
a desire in the long-run for there to be a system 
for assessing Providers in relation to the quality 
of their services and their success rates with 
grant applications. This has been a recurring 
theme throughout the programme and such 
a platform would provide VCSEs with more 
information (and power) in the marketplace to 
make informed choices as to which Providers 
to choose. Conversely, such a platform would 
also provide a space for Providers to market 
themselves, respond to negative (and positive) 
feedback, and network with potential VCSE 
clients. The participant also related this back 
to the issue of Provider day rates that has also 
been an issue that has repeatedly emerged from 
the interviews.
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…We looked at a chart that showed 
what percentage of applications 
have been successfully approved by 
Provider, and [Provider Name] was right at 
the top I remember, and [Provider Name] 
was quite near the bottom I remember…
now that could be an indication that they 
are just very good at writing proposals, but I 
think it’s interesting to speak with advisors 
that you think have been better……
kind of creating a forum for what is the 
best sustainable future model, given 
that we don’t think that those rates [day-
rates charged by Providers] are 
sustainable… (P38 – Panel/Investor)
It should be noted however, that despite the 
issues outlined above, the overwhelming 
feedback across the three years to date on 
Provider selection and Provider working has 
been positive and a key success in the number 
of grant awards made throughout the period.
4.7 Grant application and panel feedback
In regards to the preparation and submission 
of the grant application, the VCSEs interviewed 
identified the significant time resources required 
to complete the application. This was seen as a 
limiting factor for BPA, especially for the SME-
sized organisations that characterise the VCSE 
sector as a whole.
…[You] need a meeting on who 
is doing what in the application, 
because it got to a point where I started it, 
but there was a bit of an overlap, and I think 
that the project management process could 
have been slightly better. Because, if I had 
known that it would involve quite so much 
of my time then I would have been able to 
allocate a lot more of my time to do it. I just 
think that when it is last minute and you 
have got to try and respond to something 
on a short deadline then things can get 
compromised, especially in SMEs when you 
have got three or four jobs anyway… 
(P33 – Successful VCSE)
Another VCSE argued that the process for the 
BPA as a whole, but particularly at the pre-
application submission phase, was not always 
clear, with the VCSE unsure of when they would 
hear decisions. Whilst much of this information 
is available online, many participants did discuss 
the ‘clunky’ nature of the website and the 
lack of ease with which they could find such 
information, especially when compared with 
other grant funding programmes.
I did not know what the outcomes 
would be of the different steps, so 
am I going to get an answer after this step 
or does that move us on to another step? 
And that wasn’t as transparent as would 
have been helpful, and [other grant funder] 
was better in comparison.  
(P31 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
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One interesting comment made during the 
interviews by an investor and BPA Panel 
member, related to whether BPA should have 
had an earlier engagement for VCSEs with 
investors/commissioners, to act as an early-
warning to the VCSE and Provider as to what 
development was required for the VCSE to 
become IR and/or CR, so that this could be built 
into the grant application itself14.
Actually I wonder, there is definitely 
need for grant support, but actually 
sometimes there is just a need for overall 
clarity of communication…so that they get 
the input that they need before they design 
the programme that they are working on…
so look, [investor name] would you be 
willing to read the application, but probably 
more evaluate the business and give us 
a sense of feedback of what is needed 
and that can be used as a sort of valuable 
context for the organisation to use when 
they write their application, because it will 
give them the perspective of the investor [or 
Commissioner].  
(P38 – Panel/Investor)
Following the completion of the grant application 
the VCSE then submits their application 
for scrutiny by the panel who then make a 
recommendation to Big Lottery for grant 
approval. 
In relation to Year Three of the BPA, a total of 
95 grant applications were submitted to the 
panel with an average value requested of just 
under £82,000. 50 grant awards were then made 
(including two accepted after resubmission) 
with an average value of just over £69,000 
14 A question is raised here as to whether investors/commissioners 
could have been engaged to deliver this, set against the costs of 
doing so from a resource point of view (and the capacity of investors 
and commissioners themselves). However, it is an interesting point to 
consider in the design of future programmes similar to BPA.
and 45 applications were rejected. Of the Year 
Three grant applications made, 40 related to 
investment readiness, 41 to contract readiness 
and 14 were for both investment and contract 
readiness. 
When examining the dataset as a whole (Years 
One, Two and Three combined) the data reveals 
that for the 231 grant applications15, the average 
grant requested was just under £78,000; with 
137 grant awards being made16 (59.3% success 
rate) to an average value of £70,00017. Figure 4.8 
below provides an overview of this data.
Figure 4.8 – Grant Applications Overview
Nb. See Appendix F for the full statistical breakdown.
15 23 VCSEs in Year 1; 113 VCSEs in Year 2; 95 VCSEs in Year 3. It should 
be noted that whilst SIB received 248 grant applications to BPA in total, 
17 of these were resubmissions, hence the total number of VCSEs was 
231.
16 136 grant awards were made in the end, as one VCSE declined the 
grant award offer.
17 This compares with the ICRF that had a success rate for grant 
applications of 54% and an average grant award of just over £84,000 
(Ecorys, October 2015).
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In the first two years of BPA, there was a trend 
for contract readiness applications (78%) to be 
more likely to succeed at Panel and be awarded 
a grant, than investment readiness applications 
(56%). This trend continued into Year 3, albeit 
the gap reduced, with CR applications being 
less likely to succeed than previously (51%), 
and IR applications remaining at similar success 
levels (55% success rate). The difference 
here was however, unlike in previous reports, 
not statistically significant (X = 2.5; p = .07). 
Nevertheless, CR proposals still had a higher 
chance of success than IR applications over 
the course of BPA18 [see Appendix F for a full 
statistical breakdown]. As was reported last 
year, there are clear differences between IR and 
CR journeys that could impact perceptions of 
different applications as has been noted in prior 
research (Ronicle and Fox, October 2015)19, 
but it does show that for whatever reason, CR 
applications are more likely to progress to grant 
awards than IR applications20. 
The interview data was inconclusive in 
this respect, as there were no clear biases 
towards CR proposals identified by the Panel 
interviewees. Indeed, one interviewee who had 
been on the BPA and ICRF panels before it, even 
commented that the balance of stakeholders 
on the BPA Panel was much less investment 
skewed than on ICRF. It is therefore difficult to 
ascertain why CR proposals were more likely to 
succeed.
18 A similar trend emerged on the ICRF programme with just over half of 
contract readiness applications being successful compared with just 
over one-third of investment readiness applications (Ecorys, October 
2015).
19 Indeed, Ronicle and Fox (October 2015) note that on ICRF the applicant 
ventures were perceived to be closer to CR than IR, hence the greater 
proportion of CR applications accepted and the greater success rate 
of VCSE applicants securing contracts (50%) compared with those 
securing investments (33%).
20 It should be noted that these reasons could include: Panel favouring CR 
proposals; Providers being better equipped to support CR applications; 
clearer progression routes for CR applications; and/or CR VCSEs being 
more robust than IR VCSEs (or better at writing proposals).
I think that they learnt from ICRF 
where it was a lot of investors 
around a table, and there was definitely 
a much better balance of people with 
experience of different sectors…on [BPA] 
there are a lot more people with experience 
of healthcare commissioning…so it was 
a much better balance of people with 
experience of different backgrounds, and 
we were quote good at listening to what 
people were saying.  
(P30 – Panel Member/Investor)
In last year’s report it was also noted that panel 
members perceived a potential inability of some 
members to disassociate themselves from their 
day jobs when assessing grant applications 
(i.e. viewing the application as an IR proposal 
rather than a social investment deal). This was 
explored in the interviews this year and the data 
does not reveal this to be a significant issue. 
Indeed, the participants argued that the panels 
were well organised and chaired. However, some 
issues were identified in relation to the group 
dynamic maybe stifling debate about borderline 
applications (not in relation to the organisation of 
the Panel, more just human nature).
It [Panel] was very well run and very 
well convened, I think the opinions  
were frank… (P32 – Panel/Investor)
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I did find that the Chair was good at 
managing time and that the Chair 
was good at trying to get opinions from 
different parts of the group. But I do find 
that when you think it’s a no, and everyone 
else thinks it’s a yes, you soften your no, 
and that means that certain risks or issues 
are not raised or are you know not given the 
prominence they might be if it was impartial 
opinion forming. 
(P38 – Panel/Investor)
It was also noted that perhaps a more formalised 
approach to setting benchmarks in decision-
making would have been better, to ensure 
consistency across the grant award decision-
making process within the panel. This was based 
on a perception that with the Panel composition 
changing from meeting to meeting (with different 
people attending when available) and the often 
limited time to be able to assess applications, 
perhaps very similar applications might be 
accepted/rejected at different meetings21.
21 Participants did acknowledge the role that SIB played here in trying 
to ensure consistency of decision-making across different panel 
meetings/members (institutional memory). However, some participants 
argued that this did not always prevent grant-award decisions being 
made that some panel members could not understand given their 
experiences of previous meetings.
I think it’s about reading across and 
applying consistency, so if you are 
saying no to one, then what is the yardstick 
that you then use to measure and then say 
well that applies to these across the board, 
or do you consciously say that was then 
and this is different now. So perhaps a bit 
more rigour around that…I don’t know if 
you ever watch cricket, but when the light 
gets bad they take a reading and whatever 
the reading is when they go off one night is 
what then determines for the rest of the Test 
Match when they go off the ground. So clear 
standards are set…”  
(P32 – Panel/Investor)
Nevertheless, the panel process, its design, 
organisation and feedback were generally well 
received and the VCSEs noted no issues in the 
feedback that they had been given, even if the 
rejections for the unsuccessful VCSEs were still 
understandable difficult.
In relation to the reasons given by the panel for 
the 94 rejected grant applications, figure 4.9 
on the follwing page details these. The data 
reveals that the main reason for applications 
being rejected related to: poor financials; poor 
investment/contract readiness; poor activity 
breakdown; unclear social impact; and unclear 
contract, which accounted for nearly three-
quarters (72.1%) of all rejection reasons. These 
results are broadly in-line with the findings from 
the Year 1 and Year 2 reports, although ‘poor 
activity breakdown’ and ‘unclear contract’ were 
more likely to appear in Year 3 as a rejection 
reason than in previous years. Furthermore, 
there remained the discrepancy identified in 
the first two years between the prevalence of 
‘unclear contract’ and ‘unclear investment’ as 
rejection reasons within CR and IR applications 
respectively. Indeed, for CR applications ‘unclear 
contract’ was a rejection reason in 36.1% 
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of applications, whereas for IR applications 
‘unclear investment’ was a rejection reason in 
only 12.4% of applications. 
Finally, when examining the data related to 
VCSE organisational demographics (age; 
staffing; turnover; profitability; investment/
contract value being sought; and grant amount 
requested) and grant application success, no 
statistically significant differences were found.
Figure 4.9 –  
Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Nb. See Appendix G for the full statistical breakdown.
4.10 Post-grant development
In relation to the post-grant development phase, 
the data contained in the evaluation report to 
date (as of December 31st 2017) is beginning 
to evidence the long-term impact of the BPA 
programme on VCSE organisations, as more 
organisations complete the post-grant phase 
(beyond 12 months), and secure contracts and/
or investments. As of the end of Year 3 of the 
137 grant awards made, 38 VCSEs have secured 
investments and contracts totalling nearly £460 
million (£459,056,859) with an average deal 
value of £12.08 million (median value of £2.55 
million)22. This breaks down to £15.19 million 
of investments (average deal of £1.52 million 
across 10 VCSEs); and £443.87 million of 
contracts across 30 contract awards (average 
contract value of £14.8 million)23. Clearly then, 
BPA has been more successful in leveraging 
contract wins than investment deals, in part due 
to the higher proportion of contract readiness 
grants provided.
This represents a significant increase on the 
investment and contract wins reported in Year 
2 (£226 million) and demonstrates that BPA is 
now having significant impact on contract and 
investment wins as we travel further downstream 
in VCSEs post-grant journey. In addition, it 
should be noted that of these 137 grant awards, 
52 were not yet 12 months’ post-grant by 
December 31st 2017 and so further contract and 
investment wins are likely in the coming year 
(and will be explored in the Year 4 report).
This total value of contracts and investments 
secured of £460 million, based upon 137 
grant investments totalling a value of nearly 
£10m (£9,989,842), represents an investment-
22 This figure is skewed by a large contract win of £220m by one VCSE. 
If this is removed from the calculations, then the average deal value is 
£6.46 million.
23 This figure is skewed by the one large contract win of £220 million 
secured by one VCSE. If this is removed from the analysis the average 
contract value is £7.7 million.
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contract/grant ratio of nearly £46:1 in value (a 
21% increase over the Year 2 value of £38:1). 
This represents a significant financial return 
that can be attributed to the BPA programme. 
In addition, if the 52 VCSEs that are not yet 
12 months post-grant are removed from this 
calculation, then the 83 grant awards remaining 
(value of £6,516,593) set against the investment/
contract wins produces an investment-contract/
grant ratio of over £70:1. This compares with 
the ICRF programme, which returned a total 
of £233 million of contracts and investments 
(spread across 84 VCSEs at an average value 
of £2.8 million) from a total of £13.2 million in 
grant funding (giving an investment/contract 
grant ratio of £18:1) (Ecorys, October 2015). 
Figure 4.11 below provides an overview of BPA 
performance around investment and contract 
wins to date.
Figure 4.11 – Grant Investments and 
Investment/Contracts Secured
In Year 3 the post-grant work that was carried 
out by the VCSEs and Providers was very 
much in line with the findings from Years 1 
and 2, The majority (over half) of the support 
provided to VCSEs post-grant was centred on: 
market potential (104 of the 137 awardees and 
27% of all support requests); and quality and 
impact (97 of the 137 awardees and 25% of all 
support requests)24. However, all five categories 
were relatively significant in relation to VCSE 
need with even the lowest need (Financial 
Control) being identified by 47 of the 137 grant 
awardees). Figure 4.12 below illustrates this:
Figure 4.12 – Post-grant Award Support
Nb. See Appendix H for the full statistical breakdown.
24 As a VCSE applicant can identify more than one support need in its 
application, the 137 grant awardees identified a total of 392 support 
needs between them across 5 different areas. This represents an 
average of 2.86 support needs per VCSE.
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The VCSEs that were post-grant award were 
all very positive about the support that the 
BPA programme had given them and what 
it had enabled them to do in collaboration 
with their Provider. However, both VCSEs and 
Providers raised the issue of delivering long-
term outcomes within the grant phase and 
the difficulties of doing this. This in part was 
due to the ecosystem factors that limited the 
development of products and services as 
quickly as had been hoped (so outside of the 
control of all parties). This reflects the often 
difficult development journey of VCSEs, even 
on a more advanced programme like BPA, 
and reinforces the findings of the previous 
evaluations in relation to wider ecosystem 
factors (explored later in the report) and also that 
VCSE IR and CR development is not something 
that can be measured in months. Nevertheless, 
where outcomes were delayed, SIB’s role in 
providing flexibility in the post-grant phase was 
acknowledged.
For the longer-term outcomes 
within the Big Potential project, half 
of them were achieved within the window, 
but [for] the other half [development of new 
product] it may be another 18 months before 
we achieve that one.  
(P33 – Successful VCSE)
We have had some timing issues 
where tenders and contracts weren’t 
released, but then SIB were very flexible 
and said well if you need a two or three 
month wait before you submit the next 
report that was okay. So I think that process 
has been fine and the draw-downs 
have been fine. (P35 - Provider)
One area that was highlighted repeatedly by 
stakeholders was in relation to trustee risk-
aversion amongst charitable VCSEs, with 
trustees lack of engagement/understanding/
willingness with IR/CR development being seen 
as a key barrier to VCSEs developing through 
the grant phase. It was acknowledged that there 
might be good reasons for this given trustees 
responsibilities; however, it was also argued 
that early engagement with trustees was critical 
in developing IR/CR and producing successful 
outcomes.
I think there is a natural reticence 
from trustees who often are very 
senior people in the large charities, who are 
often good risk-takers in their day to day 
life, they become a trustee and suddenly 
they walk through a vortex and suddenly 
they can’t take and risk whatsoever. 
(P30 – Panel Member/Investor)
The impact of the BPA in relation to social 
impact and social impact measurement is an 
area that the research team (in collaboration 
with SIB) has been attempting to explore in 
this research. As part of this SIB developed 
the process for tracking the social impact of 
VCSE applicants, as well as how they measure 
this (the MIAA). The MIAA is carried out by 
SIB as an external assessment of VCSE social 
impact in relation to 15 questions that explore 
three categories: mission fulfilment; beneficiary 
perspective; and wider impacts. SIB conducts 
the MIAA with VCSEs at two stages: The first 
MIAA is conducted when a grant has been 
awarded to a VCSE; whilst the second MIAA 
is conducted when the post-grant work is 
completed and the monitoring of the grant with 
the VCSE is closed. The MIAA has a maximum 
score out of 30 and the tool is being used to 
understand how engagement with the BPA 
25
shapes VCSE social impact and its measurement 
over time. The data gathered to date identifies 
that VCSEs on entering the programme/
completing the grant, have an average MIAA 
score of 62.6% (n=133). The longitudinal analysis 
(n=37) also reveals that VCSEs perceive a small 
impact on their social impact through engaging 
with the BPA of +5.4% (p < .001), demonstrating 
a statistically significant positive impact on their 
delivery of social impact (see figure 4.13).
Figure 4.13 – MIAA Scores Longitudinally
Nb. See Appendix I for a full statistical breakdown. Longitudinal analysis 
based upon 37 VCSEs that completed the MIAA at Time 1 and Time 2.
In terms of the impacts of BPA on VCSEs, the 
interviewees saw clear benefits of engaging 
with BPA and going through the post-grant 
award phase. In particular, one VCSE identified 
the confidence that the process had given the 
organisation by increasing their knowledge and 
allowing them to understand precisely what they 
needed to develop. Whilst in the below instance 
the VCSE decided against pursuing a social 
impact bond ultimately, BPA had empowered 
them to make that decision with confidence.
As a result of this grant, and ICRF, 
and working with [Provider name] 
we are confident now that we can do it 
[Social Impact Bond] ourselves now and we 
are confident that we could make a decision 
on whether its viable and think about a 
legal structure. I do think that there will be 
situations like where you are working with 
partners, or lots of different things, where 
you might still need legal advice, but I don’t 
think any grant would ever take that away I 
don’t think, at least you know you need legal 
advice I suppose and where to get it 
from. (P36 – Successful VCSE)
However, the impacts were not just confined 
to grant awardees, as VCSEs that had been 
rejected at the grant award phase still felt that 
the process had been positive. In one case it had 
led to the securing of grant funding elsewhere 
(and example of a funding win, even if not one 
directly related to IR/CR). Another VCSE had 
further developed their relationship with their 
Provider to become a tenant in the Provider’s 
offices, which had provided them with resources 
(financial and non-financial) to allow them to 
focus 100% on the business and scaling up their 
products/services.
Now that [office sharing with 
Provider] means that we just 
have the focus and headspace to work on 
the business rather than running lots of 
freelance and part-time jobs. So I think 
that is probably the incredibly impactful 
and helpful by-product of forming that 
relationship with them [Provider] 
(P37 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
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One of the Panel member interviewees also 
acknowledged the need for programmes like 
BPA in helping VCSEs to develop the ‘boring’ 
but essential elements within organisations, 
that ultimately determine whether a VCSE is 
sustainable and/or IR/CR.
 
What we are talking about with Big 
Potential is largely the boring stuff, 
so I need £50k to sort my systems out, or I 
need £50k to get a Finance Director in who 
can do all of this, or whatever it is, but it’s 
the boring stuff that these organisations are 
very poor at that means that then they don’t 
get a contract or they don’t get investment, 
and the support of the [BPA] money, it 
transforms what they can do. I am really 
passionate about that and that’s why I think 
these schemes are so important because it 
actually gives the money to do the  
boring stuff.  
(P30 – Panel Member/Investor)
However, one Panel member did raise concerns 
as to what the ultimate impact of BPA would 
be, and whether grant funding programmes in 
general act as a dressage for the wider problems 
of the VCSE sector, particularly if grant awardees 
did not win contracts and/or investment. It 
must be acknowledged that the lack of deal-
flow witnessed in the first two years supported 
such a critique, but the deals emerging in the 
Year 3 data and outlined earlier in this report, 
show that the problems with programmes such 
as BPA might be more to do with the longer 
timescales than expected to drive IR/CR even 
in the advanced VCSE sector. Wider ecosystem 
factors (explored in the next section) are also an 
issue here.
 
My slight concern in a lot of this stuff 
and I worry in the same way with a 
lot of this softer funding, is are you giving 
drugs to an addict? Are we avoiding some 
of these organisations [VCSEs] taking the 
tough medicine? Because if we can clearly 
point to something else and that we have 
helped them address their issues and build 
on their strengths, very consistently then 
I think its fine, but we need to look at that 
and ask if we are really doing that or are we 
just kicking the can down the road, and in 
two years’ time these organisations are by 
and large not going to be investable. I think 
the proof of the pudding is in the eating and 
looking at what they have gone on to do on 
their journeys beyond getting these grants. 
Have they gone on to actually raise money 
and if not why not? Did they get the contract; 
did they get investment?  
(P32 – Panel/Investor)
Finally, and continuing a theme to emerge in 
the previous evaluation, was the impact of 
BPA on the Provider market. This was seen 
by interviewees as critical in the development 
of the marketplace, both in encouraging more 
commercial consultants into the VCSE space 
and in scaling the sector as a whole.
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When we operated more 
commercially it was definitely more 
private sector companies [customers] so 
I think that the funded programmes [ICRF 
and BPA] probably have brought us into 
more contact with a much wider client base 
and a lot of those will be not-for-profits. I 
think it has made us more aware of their 
needs, so we are doing more grant funding 
applications and we are looking at our 
pricing structure to make it more sensitive 
to their [third sector] needs.  
(P35 - Provider)
 
We need to grow the advisory 
market in the charity space, because most 
companies…can’t run without buying 
in advice at some point, so I don’t know 
why we think that charities can. Charities 
need more advice than anyone else quite 
frankly...If we build an advisory market 
where bigger firms see the benefit of having 
a team in this space and we get mid-size 
to large charities just seeing the benefit of 
paying the money and getting the advice, 
then I think we have done a good thing. So 
I know it’s something of a secondary aim of 
BPA, but I think it’s an equally worthy one. 
(P30 – Panel Member/Investor)
4.14 Ecosystem Factors and Deal-flow
Whilst in the Year 2 report the focus was on the 
lack of deal flow to date, the progress of VCSE 
grant awardees on BPA since has meant that 
the deal-flow picture is looking significantly 
improved in Year 3 (as was noted earlier). This 
upturn was explored in the qualitative interview 
data with VCSEs, as were the impacts of wider 
systemic factors on investment and contract 
wins within the VCSE ecosystem. One area that 
these wider factors impact on VCSEs is on their 
sustainability, with one VCSE acknowledging 
that there was a need for them to diversify their 
income streams in order to overcome ecosystem 
problems in their sector. 
We are limited there by the 
economic climate and our sales 
performance, so rather than be limited by 
that let’s try and broaden our operating  
plan and try and help [beneficiaries] in  
other sectors.  
(P33 – Successful VCSE)
In relation to CR, there was an acknowledgement 
that the ecosystem around contracts was not 
overly supportive to VCSEs gaining market 
share. This was in part due to the behaviour 
of commissioners and commissioning bodies 
such as local authorities, as well as the difficulty 
in supporting VCSEs to become CR, as the 
concept itself was seen as heterogeneous and 
multifaceted.
There is a lot of irrational behaviour, 
increasingly so, happening amongst 
Commissioners. We have projects that 
get postponed, dropped, picked up again, 
not talked about again. We find a lot of 
lumpiness in Commissioner behaviour, 
which…in a 12-month evaluation period can 
result in things falling out…  
(P38 – Panel/Investor)
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Contract readiness is very different 
as you don’t have the same context 
and no two contracts are the same, no two 
procurement processes are the same…so 
I think it’s a harder thing to gauge contract 
readiness, because obviously nobody is 
going to tell you we have only got one shot 
in a thousand at winning this contract, 
whereas you can much more objectively 
look at an investment readiness 
propositions. (P32 – Panel/Investor)
In addition, the need for post-contract award 
support was also acknowledged, and it was 
argued that future programmes similar to 
BPA should explore providing this, as many 
VCSEs that win contracts are poorly equipped 
to deal with sudden large contracts. Such 
support would in the main involve quality and 
compliance, policies and procedures and 
data returns/reporting (including social impact 
measurement).
 
We had one organisation that was 
turning over something like £200,000 
and they won a £4 million contract, so 
definitely even a follow-up programme, as 
they could grow even further. So they have 
the potential with this £4 million contract 
to, if they dig into that and deliver well, 
to grow again. Now not all organisations 
will, but I think there are some that if they 
win a big contract definitely need some 
implementation support.  
(P35 - Provider)
There were also problems identified in relation 
to securing social investment, in relation to 
cost and suitability. One participant argued that 
the lack of investments in VCSEs should be 
viewed in comparison with the traditional private 
sector, where investments in SMEs are also 
low. Given such a comparison why would we 
expect significant numbers of VCSEs to secure 
investment in any form, given that they are often 
less capitalised and profitable than private  
sector SMEs?
Borrowing isn’t for everybody, if 
you look at the mainstream SME 
marketplace, only about 8% of SMEs borrow 
money, so I think we need to see charities 
and social businesses borrowing within  
that context  
(P30 – Panel Member/Investor)
The issue of cost was also a factor, with one 
VCSE using their BPA grant to scope out a 
social impact bond. The result of this was to 
demonstrate to them that a bond was not 
a suitable mechanism for them to utilise in 
financing their new programme, whilst debt 
finance from a social investor was considered 
as too expensive. This didn’t stop them securing 
investment, they just secured this instead 
through a traditional bank loan.
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I suppose the end result of us 
winning those things is that we 
didn’t get any social investment in the end, 
we decided after all of the information that 
we had that and the advice that actually we 
are just going to borrow it from a bank…
because that was the best option for us. We 
could borrow from our bank with a much 
lower interest rate…Our general feeling 
about it [social investment] is that the 
borrowing is expensive…when we set the 
first ones up [VCSE’s first social investment] 
and looked at…and we had an SPV [Special 
Purpose Vehicle] everyone had to go on joint 
employment contracts…there was a VAT 
issue, the amount of stuff we did and the 
legal fees, and then setting up the way that 
we monitor it…it just feels wasteful,  
really, really, wasteful.  
(P36 – Successful VCSE)
It was not just BPA grant awardees that 
identified the lack of suitability of social 
investment for their development, with an 
unsuccessful applicant also using just their 
application phase to identify that securing 
investment was not the best way to scale their 
business, and that renting assets to achieve the 
same goals was actually more cost effective.
 
It [application] really refined our 
thinking around what we did…
it kind of makes you test the practicalities 
because you have to make a case for it and 
sort of tested some of the initial thoughts 
that we had…So the initial thought was 
that we would buy the properties…we are 
now at the point post-BPA that buying the 
properties seems deeply unlikely to us and 
we think that we would struggle to raise the 
funds to do it, but actually, a rental of the 
property would work.  
(P31 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
Finally, a panel member and investor also argued 
that if ecosystem factors are to be overcome, 
then there needs to be more early engagement 
of investors and commissioners with VCSEs to 
identify high potential organisations that can 
progress quickly to (and are suitable for) social 
investment or contracts.  As was noted above, 
this would likely be a very small proportion of the 
VCSE sector as a whole.
If we are trying to get these 
organisations investable, or 
potentially commissionable, what role is 
there for that investor or commissioner to 
kind of, you know, sort of articulate that 
they are actually close enough to a position 
where this funding would make the 
difference. (P38 – Panel/Investor)
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4.15 Case studies
In the Year 2 report the research introduced case study analysis to identify VCSEs that had engaged on 
BPA journeys with differing outcomes. In the last report VCSE-A had successfully secured investment, 
whilst VCSE-B had secured a public sector contract. In this year’s report two further case studies are 
presented: VCSE-C is an organisation that has secured investment (and is now seeking a contract), but 
interestingly is a VCSE that progressed from Big Potential Breakthrough (BPB), to BPA before going 
on to secure its investment deal. Therefore, it represents an interesting case of a VCSE journey that 
has traversed the entire Big Potential support programme. VCSE-D is an organisation that secured a 
BPA grant to pursue CR, but has yet failed to secure any contracts following the support (at the time 
of the interview the VCSE was 6 months’ post-grant and still in the second stage of its grant delivery 
programme. The case studies are designed to tell the story of each VCSEs journey through Big 
Potential and to evidence the differing routes, experiences and outcomes that VCSEs can encounter 
with BPA support.
VCSE-C operates in the housing sector 
and is based in the West Midlands (it also 
operates in the South West region). It is a 
Company Limited by Guarantee and when 
applying to BPA it had: been in operation 
for 9 years; employed 20 staff (16 FT and 4 
PT) and had 10 volunteers; had a turnover 
of £1.9 million with a 13.2% profit margin on25 
this turnover; VCSE-C won both a Preliminary 
grant and subsequently an Investment Plan 
grant whilst on BPB, and used this to secure 
£1 million in social investment (£500,000 up 
front and another £500,000 in principle) and 
is now on BPA exploring contract readiness 
with the view to securing contracts worth 
£1.2 million. In its application VCSE-C 
identified its CR needs as being related 
to financial performance, market potential 
and quality and impact. Having targeted 
a BPA grant however, VCSE-C decided to 
change Provider, based upon a desire to go 
25 Elements of this case study have been taking from the Year 3 BPB 
report where the VCSE first appeared. However, all primary data 
including quotes is from a second interview held with the VCSE in 
February 2018.
in a different direction and the need to have 
someone more local.
It [changing Provider] was about having 
more control over the relationship. So 
our initial Provider was London based, so we 
transferred to one where there was a local 
representative. It just made it easier for 
ongoing discussions……It wasn’t a reflection 
of what we had done, more of a reflection of 
where we wanted to go, and what we wanted 
to create. (VCSE-C – Business 
Development Manager)
VCSE-C was also critical of the day rates 
being paid to Providers and did not feel that 
this was good value for money, especially as 
around 75% of the grant received went out 
to the Provider, leaving the organisation as 
under-resourced in its opinion26
Having secured the BPA grant VCSE-C used 
the money and the post-grant phase to work 
with the Provider to bring together value 
propositions that would allow them to access 
high value contracts related to the delivery 
26 This is an area that if SIB had been aware would have been 
tackled. Indeed, Providers should not have been charging more on 
BPA than they did in their core business.
4.15.1 – VCSE-C (Investment Winner  
& BPB Graduate)25
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of training and education. However, VCSE-C 
again felt that the Provider did not give them 
great value for money here, as the support 
and advice they received was too theoretical 
as opposed to practically enabling them to go 
on and win contracts.
With a different provider we would have 
had a different result…because we are 
quite a high-speed dynamic business, but they 
were sat around with theories and they had 
obviously been to Cambridge and done MBAs 
or whatever so very nice, but were kind of 
short on practical experience. So I got quite a 
lot of nice theoretical background value 
propositions, but not a lot of usable  
operational stuff. (VCSE-C – Business 
Development Manager)
However, despite these issues VCSE-C still 
argued that they had developed internally as 
an organisation through BPA, and that whilst 
the large contracts that they had targeted 
had not yet been secured, they had secured 
other smaller contracts to a combined value 
of around £500,000. This in itself represents a 
significant return on a grant that was around 
10% of these contract wins.
It was useful to have the conversations 
with them [Provider] as it gave us the 
opportunity to bounce some ideas off them and 
gave us some critical thinking space…but the 
model that we have adopted ourselves has 
actually come from our thinking and our 
direction of travel, rather than the Provider 
actually helping us to get to that point.  
(VCSE-C – Business  
Development Manager)
Whilst no significant contracts have been won 
as of yet, this is still a focus as is securing 
further investment. However, further growth 
in debt finance will be limited and will have 
to keep pace (rather than outstripping it) with 
the growth in capacity of the organisation. In 
addition, VCSE-C is keen to ensure that risks 
to its ability to keep delivering high quality 
provision to its beneficiaries are kept low, but 
it wants to pursue growth of around 150% in 
turnover over the next five years.
Over the next five years I don’t think we 
will breach the £2 million mark [from 
social investment] and will remain at around 
£1.5 million in total debt, just because to build 
up the [estate management] we are developing 
existing staff so the finances and everything 
else to go with it needs investment in it as a 
business, so we need to be able to grow our 
staff to be able to be able to manage it and use 
it effectively……we have grown quite 
spectacularly over the last few years and we 
have won awards for what we have done, but 
you have still got to make sure that the risks 
for the [beneficiaries] is kept low.  
(VCSE-C – Business  
Development Manager)
Finally, VCSE-C was keen to stress that its 
overall experience of BPA, despite some 
of the problems outlined above, had been 
positive, stating:
It’s worked reasonably well for us…it’s 
been quite a good growth journey for us 
to be honest. (VCSE-C – Business  
Development Manager)
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VCSE-D operates in the employment and 
education sector and is based in London. 
It is a Company Limited by Guarantee with 
Charitable Status and when applying to 
BPA it had: been in operation for 17 years; 
employed 20 staff (15 FT and 5 PT) and had 
45 volunteers; had a turnover of £1.02 million 
with a 23.1% profit margin on this turnover; 
and is now on BPA exploring contract 
readiness with the view to securing contracts 
worth £1.5 million. In its application VCSE-D 
identified its CR needs as being related to 
governance, financial performance, and 
market potential. VCSE-D applied to BPA as 
it needed support to diversify its income by 
winning contracts due to the ever diminishing 
amounts of grant funding that exist in the 
sector. BPA provided it with the finances 
required to gain the consultancy support 
that it needed to be in a position to have a 
realistic chance of securing contracts in the 
education and training sector.
The pot [grant funding] was shrinking 
massively and over the last five years 
we reckon that pot has shrunk for us by say 
75% I would say in terms of what we used to 
get compared to what we get now. So the idea 
was to access a direct source of funding that 
would feed into what we do with our 
training… (VCSE-D CEO)
Having worked with the Provider to 
secure the BPA grant, work then began 
on developing strategies for tendering, to 
formally enter into government portals for 
contract bidding, to work on the quality of 
the services provided (quality assurance) and 
to map out the tenders available now and/or 
potentially in the future.
We’ve done tendering strategies, we’ve 
tried to get them on to bidding 
frameworks, we’ve done some quality 
implementation support, we’ve got them on to 
the apprenticeship register…we’ve started a 
tender library for them as well. 
(VCSE-D Provider)
VCSE-D is now halfway through its post-
grant phase on BPA, but has experienced 
delays, which have to a small degree caused 
some issues with the Provider, in the main it 
seems to be a lack of clear communication 
between both parties. Indeed, VCSE-D 
is clear that these delays are the fault of 
commissioning bodies which have delayed 
the release of contracts or their form (another 
example of ecosystem factors interfering 
with a CR journey), but the Provider was not 
aware of this and had been wondering if the 
VCSE (or its Trustees) had got cold feet on 
the CR journey. Indeed, the Provider in an 
effort to overcome perceived Trustee risk-
aversion had been and delivered a workshop 
with the Trustees to try and overcome this. 
However, the CEO stated that aside from a 
few individuals in the VCSE, the majority of 
the SMT and Trustees were on board with the 
new direction and CR journey.
[Delays] are nothing to do with us,  
that is to do with the government 
[Department Name]…so we are there 
champing at the bit, but the door isn’t 
open unfortunately.” (VCSE-D CEO)
It is a very lengthy process for 
something that for us is a no-brainer, 
but we can’t see what the [problem is], maybe 
we need more empathy [with the VCSE]. But 
we can’t see why it is taking so long to make 
their decision?!” (VCSE-D Provider)
4.15.2 – VCSE-D (Contract Readiness 
Grant Awardee)
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We have met the trustees and did a 
presentation, there is some risk-
aversion from some of them…it is an issue 
and work has to be done with the trustees and 
we have been doing more of that. But I am not 
sure when I speak to the CEO whether he is 
reflecting their opinion, or whether it’s his 
opinion and he’s trying to make it seem like 
it’s coming from the trustees. 
(VCSE-D Provider)
These delays and the changes to the 
contracts has meant that VCSE-D has/will 
need to change the direction that it pursues 
in the second half of the grant, to focus on 
different contracts and training qualification 
frameworks in order to achieve its goals 
(the CEO was very clear however that the 
social mission and aims remained exactly the 
same as before). This represents a change 
in business strategy then rather than overall 
strategic direction.
We are very good at what we do…but 
what we have to do is look at other 
[opportunities] outside of the [contract name], 
and still achieve the same results…we still 
achieve what we want to achieve but it will be 
a quite different route. (VCSE-D CEO)
Whilst it is still a little early to assess the 
impact of BPA on VCSE-D, it is clear that the 
organisation is undergoing a drastic change 
in its business plan, income streams and 
future market potential, and so change will 
perhaps be inevitably slow. However, winning 
contracts remains a critical focus for the 
future sustainability of the organisation and 
will remain the aim in the second half of the 
grant delivery phase for VCSE-D.
We are yet to feel it [BPA impact] 
because we haven’t got to that 
commissioning point…from a point of 
repositioning ourselves…and now move and 
change direction that is now in the process of 
actually happening…so we need to get that 
commissioned work in and then deliver the 
next lot of programmes. (VCSE-D CEO)
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5.1 Overview of Performance
BPA is a programme that has delivered robust 
support to the VCSE sector around IR and CR 
support, and the results of this are starting to 
be identified through the increasing level of 
investment and contract wins being generated 
by VCSE grant awardees (especially in relation to 
contracts). By the end of the grant award phase 
of BPA, 231 grant applications were received27 
(23 VCSEs in Year 1; 113 VCSEs in Year 2; 
95 VCSEs in Year 3) and 135 grant awards 
made. The breakdown of these applications 
is: 99 investment applications; 96 contract 
applications; and 36 investment and contract 
applications. Of these 231 applications, 137 
grant awards were made (average value of 
£70,000; 64 x contract; 56 x investment; 17 x 
investment/contract), 94 were rejected, whilst 
one of the VCSEs offered a grant declined it. As 
of December 31st 2017 10 VCSEs had secured 
investment and 30 VCSEs had secured contracts 
totalling nearly £460 million. As to date only 62% 
of VCSE grant awardees are 12 months’ post-
grant award, the longitudinal impact in terms of 
investment and contract outcomes is likely to 
climb yet higher (and this will be explored in the 
Year 4 report).
Amongst these 231 grant applications the 
VCSE demographics were in line with the target 
organisation type with an average turnover of 
£2.1m; a low profitability rate on that turnover 
of 1.9%; the equivalent of 39 FTE 1.0 staff; an 
average age of 13 years; and seeking investment 
27 23 VCSEs in Year 1; 113 VCSEs in Year 2; 95 VCSEs in Year 3. It should 
be noted that whilst SIB received 248 grant applications to BPA in total, 
17 of these were resubmissions, hence the total number of VCSEs was 
231.
and/or contracts of £2m and £2.2m respectively. 
Whilst the BPA has strong programme 
engagement with London, Yorkshire and Humber 
and the North East; it struggled in relation to 
applications in the East Midlands (-3.5%), the 
East of England (-5.3%) and the West Midlands 
(-2.5%) when compared with national averages 
(NCVO, 2016). Nearly three-quarters (72.8%) of 
VCSE applicants operated at least on a regional 
basis in their service provision. Nearly two-
thirds of applicants were Companies Limited 
by Guarantee, but 78% of all applicants had 
a formalised social purpose built into their 
legal and governance structures (charitable 
status/CIC/IPS). Finally, 66.2% of the applicant 
VCSEs operated in: employment, training and 
education, and/or in: housing and local facilities, 
mental health and wellbeing, and citizenship and 
community.
As was outlined in previous reports, most VCSEs 
it seems have an established relationship with 
their Providers prior to engaging with BPA, with 
personal networks and prior relationships being 
critical in establishing Provider relationships. 
However, a number of VCSEs were critical 
of Providers due to the day rates charged, 
Provider quality (an area that other stakeholders 
felt should be explored further), and also of 
a perceived lack of flexibility on BPA to use 
multiple Providers and have greater freedom in 
spending the grant funding28. The application 
itself was also critiqued as being overly time 
consuming and with an unclear process. 
Interestingly, one of the panel members (who 
is also an investor) argued that investors and 
28 In relation to this last point, it should be noted that changes to the 
post-grant phase plans and spend were rarely rejected by SIB where 
they could be justified.
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commissioners should be engaged to feedback 
on applications and business plans prior to their 
submission so that VCSEs could get feedback 
on what support they needed.
The Panel decision-making phase of the BPA 
was also viewed positively, albeit some panel 
members would have liked to see more debate 
over applications that were less clear accept/
reject propositions. In relation to the reasons 
that applications were rejected, poor financials, 
poor investment/contract readiness, poor activity 
breakdown, unclear social impact, and unclear 
contract, accounted for nearly three-quarters 
(72.1%) of all rejection reasons. 
The data does also present some interesting 
findings in relation to application type success, 
with contract readiness applications having an 
67% success rate compared with an investment 
readiness application rate of 55%. A number of 
reasons are suggested for this including: Panel 
favouring CR proposals; Providers being better 
equipped to support CR applications; clearer 
progression routes for CR applications; and/or 
CR VCSEs being more robust than IR VCSEs (or 
better at writing proposals). 
The effectiveness of the post-grant phase 
appears to be high, with stakeholder’s 
positively commenting on the flexibility offered 
within this (something that was not the case 
in previous reports). However, a number of 
VCSEs experienced delays in reaching the 
desired outcomes as specified in their grant 
applications, often due to wider systemic factors 
in the ecosystem (i.e. contracts being withdrawn, 
delayed or changed) and it was recognised that 
CR and IR journeys can be lengthy even at the 
more developed end of the VCSE sector. In 
relation to the post-grant work, in the first two 
years the BPA has mainly focused on delivering 
support related to market potential (104 of the 
137 awardees and 27% of all support requests); 
and quality and impact (97 of the 137 awardees 
and 25% of all support requests). The interview 
participants also all stated that the support 
received in this phase was impactful.
Finally, in relation to the now increasing deal-
flow generated by BPA grant awardees, it is 
clear that BPA is beginning to deliver impact 
in this area. Whilst it has maybe taken longer 
than had been originally envisaged, this merely 
demonstrates the complicated nature of IR/
CR journeys for VCSEs, and how they can be 
delayed by factors often out of the control of 
the VCSEs, Providers and programme funders/
manager (BLF/SIB); as well as factors within 
organisations (i.e. risk-averse stakeholders such 
as trustees). Nevertheless, BPA is now delivering 
significant contract and investment deal-flow (in 
particular in relation to the former) and it will be 
interesting to see how this develops in the next 
12 months as the remaining 52 VCSEs complete 
their post-grant award phases and move beyond 
12 months of their grant award.
5.2 Recommendations
Whilst it is no longer practical to make 
recommendations as the BPA programme 
has now completed its grant making, wider 
recommendations for Investment Readiness 
(IR) and CR programmes can be gleaned 
from the data gathered to date, along with the 
performance of the BPA so far. These are:
1. VCSE Engagement: There remain 
entrenched regional engagement problems 
in relation to the East of England, the East 
Midlands and the West Midlands. This has 
been the case on both BPA and BPB (for the 
East of England and East Midlands) albeit 
BPA has had a higher level of engagement 
from the East of England than BPB (BPA = 
-5.3% versus BPB = -8.2% when compared 
with national averages). These regions have 
also historically been hard to reach for other 
funding programmes. Wider ecosystem 
development is required in these regions if 
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future funding programmes are to succeed 
(the North East provides an interesting case 
study of how infrastructure improvements 
can lead to improved engagement and 
deal flow, at least in relation to IR). This 
ecosystem development might include the 
following three core interventions:
a. Creation of VCSE owned/led 
networks within regions to promote 
communication and sharing of best 
practice.
b. Hubs of investors and support 
consultancies in major regional cities (as 
we have seen in Newcastle and Bristol, 
and to a degree Manchester).
c. Support from Local Government for 
the VCSE sector. Whilst in the current 
climate this might not include funding, 
other mechanisms such as policy, 
procurement/commissioning, and local 
enterprise engagement would be helpful.
2. Post-grant impact: Future programmes 
should consider additional types of grant or 
sub-grant that provide support to VCSEs 
after they have secured investment (but 
before the drawdown of funds) or following 
the securing of a contract. This additional 
funding support could be crucial in helping 
VCSEs make sustainable transitions to 
new business models or project delivery 
frameworks. Furthermore, monitoring and 
research should be extended beyond the 
18 months’ (monitoring) and 12 months 
(research) post-grant that is currently in 
place, to at least two years as it is clear 
that significant impacts are generally not 
felt over time periods of 12-18 months. This 
would likely have to be the responsibility of 
the Fund rather than the VCSE, due to the 
burdens already on VCSEs. However, VCSEs 
have a responsibility here to engage in data 
capture and actively report this back, an 
area that has not necessarily been the case 
on BPA or BPB.
3. Provider Quality: A number of stakeholders 
have articulated a desire to see more done 
to assess the quality of Providers, perhaps 
through an online platform that can be used 
by VCSEs to assess Provider performance, 
and by Providers to market their skills. 
This would also act as a networking space 
between the two stakeholder groups as 
well. VCSE and Provider fit was broadly 
articulated on the basis of Provider culture fit 
and understanding of the VCSE, as opposed 
to any technical skills deficit. VCSEs were 
also keen to know how proactive Providers 
were in the grant application phase and what 
their success rates were.
4. Wider ecosystem: There are clearly 
significant impacts on VCSE IR/CR 
journeys from wider ecosystem factors (e.g.  
unexplained commissioner behaviour; legal 
problems; ‘investability’ and why deals don’t 
happen; affordability of social investment; 
and VCSE risk-aversion). In some respects, 
it is difficult for grant funding programmes to 
counter these, but awareness of the factors 
in the design of future programmes may 
help. In this respect there was a general 
desire amongst participants across the 
three years to see a BPA2 programme. 
Programme features that may assist with 
these wider ecosystem issues as articulated 
by VCSEs/Providers are:
a. Post-win funding: Grant funding being 
allowed to be allocated to the post-
investment/contract win, to help deal 
with capacity issues and the various 
problems that can occur after securing 
investment but before drawing-down  
the money.
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b. Subsidy of Investment: Where there 
are issues of investment affordability, 
grant funding programmes could seek to 
offset some of the due-diligence costs 
(or directly subsidise products through 
blended deals) to improve affordability. 
The hope here would be that as the 
market grew and investor experience 
with it, innovative products and more 
affordable deals due to the increasing 
amounts of recycled capital, would 
begin to emerge.
c. VCSEs need to be supported/educated 
to take on some of the responsibility 
for this themselves, in researching the 
market and understanding the common 
problems that can arise, so as to be able 
to mitigate them as best as possible.
BPA has clearly performed well, with nearly 
£10m of grants awarded/offered to VCSEs. This 
grant support has to date leveraged in nearly 
£460 million of investment and contracts, across 
38 VCSEs and 40 ‘deals’29. It will be interesting 
to see how these figures increase as the 52 
remaining VCSE grant awardees who are not 
yet 12 months’ post-grant, progress in Year 4. It 
seems that the impact intended to be delivered 
by BPA is now starting to emerge.
29 As has been noted in the main report, this figure is somewhat skewed 
by the large contract win of one VCSE of £220m.
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ANOVA Analysis of Variance: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is a statistical test that is used to 
compare average scores (means) across two or more conditions (Field, 2009:348).
CIC-G Community Interest Company Limited by Guarantee
CIC-S Community Interest Company Limited by Share
CIO Charitable Incorporated Organisation
CLG Company Limited by Guarantee
CLS Company Limited by Shares
ICRF Investment and Contract Readiness Fund
IPS Industrial Provident Society
IR Investment readiness: IR relates to ‘an investee being perceived to possess the 
attributes, which makes them an investible proposition by an appropriate investor for the 
finance they are seeking’ (Gregory et al., 2012:6).
LLP Limited Liability Partnership
SI Social investment: relates to the practice of providing finance to social ventures (debt, 
equity or mezzanine finance) with an expectation that a social as well as financial return 
will be generated (Brown and Norman, 2011).
SIB Social Investment Business
SIM Social Return on Investment: SROI is a social impact measurement methodology/
tool that assesses the social/environmental impact of an organisation by monetising 
outcomes and assessing them in relation to the resources invested.
SROI Social Return on Investment: SROI is a social impact measurement methodology/
tool that assesses the social/environmental impact of an organisation by monetising 
outcomes and assessing them in relation to the resources invested.
VCSE Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise.
6. Glossary of Terms
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7.1 – Appendix A: Methodology  
& Sample Data
Quantitative data was collected through the 
online registration process and the grant 
application submissions. These captured 
organisational data (i.e. sector of operation, 
organisational reach, legal structure, financial 
data, staffing levels, and investment/contract 
readiness needs) from 231 VCSEs (23 VCSEs 
in Year 1; 113 VCSEs in Year 2; 95 VCSEs in 
Year 3). Data relating to social impact and its 
measurement was also captured from VCSEs 
both at the start of the grant application 
process, and again upon completion of the 
grant application. This was done utilising SIB’s 
bespoke designed MIAA assessment tool and 
has to date engaged with 133 VCSEs at Time 1, 
and 37 VCSEs at Time 2. All data was analysed 
using the Statistics Package for the Social 
Sciences’ (SPSS), with descriptive statistics 
sought, alongside ANOVAs and chi-squared 
cross-tabulations. 
Qualitative data in the form of a semi-structured 
interview (see Appendices I-L for the interview 
schedules) was collected from nineteen VCSEs 
(thirteen successful, four unsuccessful and 
three that were rejected but then successfully 
reapplied); seven provider organisations; 
five panel members; four investors; and one 
commissioner] was gathered in the form of 
semi-structured interviews. For the VCSE 
participants two had completed their grant 
with no investment and/or contract secured; 
whilst three VCSEs had secured investment 
and one VCSE had secured a contract. The 
remaining VCSEs were all at different stages 
of their post-grant award phase. Therefore, 
a total of 39 interviews have been held with 
stakeholders by the end of year three. As of 
December 31st 2017 the BPA had received 
and made decisions on grant applications from 
231 VCSEs, and the participant VCSEs in this 
research were selected randomly from these 231 
organisations (with the caveat that there would 
be a purposeful split across different stages of 
the programme (i.e. successful and unsuccessful 
VCSEs). The interviews explored each VCSE’s 
business model, their experience of the BPA and 
their future plans in relation to investment and 
contract readiness. The interviews were semi-
structured in nature, which also allowed the 
participant VCSE to explore areas that they felt 
were important. 
The interview data gathered was analysed using 
a narrative approach, but in relation to the five 
stages of the BPA. This narrative approach was 
used to gather a rich picture of how change 
occurred within each organisation as they 
went through the BPA and their experience of 
the BPA. In particular, the analysis sought to 
understand what elements of the BPA ‘enabled’ 
or ‘inhibited’ their investment/contract readiness 
development, their knowledge of social 
investment and/or contracts and their future 
plans (Feldman et al., 2004).  As with Feldman 
et al. (2004), the approach to data analysis was 
both inductive and iterative.
7. Appendices
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7.2 – Appendix B: VCSE Demographic Data
Table 7.1 – VCSE Age, Finance & Staffing Data
Demographic Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max
VCSE age (years) 218 17.79 13.00 18.42 1 144
Turnover 217 £7.44m £2.09m £16.68m £1,211 £173m
Net profitability 208 £291,287 £38,863 £1.07m £-462,192 £13.18m
Investment Need 134 £4.04m £2m £12.1m £150,000 £135m
Contract Need 126 £7.26m £2.2m £15.4m £100,000 £100m
Staffing
FT 214 135 33 378 0 3,600
PT 210 111 20 346 0 4,639
Volunteers 159 157 15 793 0 9,595
7.3 – Appendix C: VCSE Geographic Reach
Table 7.2 – VCSE Geographic Reach
Reach N %
Neighbourhood 0 0
Local Authority 62 27.2
Regional 95 41.6
Multi-regional 30 13.2
National 36 15.8
International 5 2.2
Total 231 100
7.4 – Appendix D: Organisational Structure
Table 7.3 – VCSE legal structures
Legal form N %
Unincorporated 2 0.9
CLG 148 65.2
CLS 3 1.3
CIO 10 4.4
CIC-S 11 4.8
CIC-G 24 10.6
IPS 9 4.0
Private Company 2 0.9
LLP 2 0.9
Other 16 7.0
Total 227 100
Charitable origins
Origin Yes No
Origin Yes No
Registered charity 148 (64.1%) 83 (35.9%)
Total 231
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7.5 – Appendix E: VCSE Sector of Operation
Table 7.4 – Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Rejection Reason N %
Employment, Training & Education 134 25.0
Housing & Local Facilities 59 11.0
Income & Financial Inclusion 22 4.1
Physical Health 50 9.3
Mental Health & Wellbeing 87 16.2
Family, Friends & Relationships 47 8.8
Citizenship & Community 75 14.0
Arts, Heritage, Sports & Faith 42 7.8
Conservation of the Natural Environment 20 3.7
Total 536 100.0
Nb. As 3 sectors can be given for each VCSE, the theoretical total for the data held on 231 applications can be 693. As not all VCSEs selected 3 separate 
sectors, N here equals 536.
7.6 – Appendix F: Grant Applications and Awards
Table 7.5 – Grant Application & Award Data
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max
Contract Value 126 £7.26m £2.2m £15.37m £100k £100m
Investment Value 134 £4.04m £2m £12.11m £150k £135m
Grant Request 231 £82,234 £77,680 £26,538 £28,344 £150,000
Grant Award Value 137 £75,412 £70,000 £24,756 £28,344 £148,515
Application Success Rates
Application Type N Yes No
Accepted after 
Resubmission
Declined
Contract 96 62.5% 33.3% 4.2% 0%
Investment 99 45.0% 44.0% 10.0% 1.0%
Investment/Contract 36 50.0% 50.0% 0% 0%
Cross-tabulation Chi-squared Test
Application Type N Yes No X
Contract 96 66.7% 33.3%
2.5
Investment 99 55.6% 44.4%
Nb. The X-value represents the Pearson’s Chi-square value. * = p < .05. The pending applications (n=2) have not been included in the analysis here.
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7.7 – Appendix G: Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Table 7.6 – Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Rejection Reason N %
Poor Market Analysis 9 6.4
Poor Financials 26 18.6
Too Early Stage 9 6.4
Poor Governance 1 0.7
Investment/Contract Readiness 18 12.9
Poor Activity Breakdown 20 14.3
Unclear Social Impact 20 14.3
Unclear Contract Deal 17 12.1
Unclear Investment Deal 11 7.9
Applicant Withdrew 2 1.4
Ineligible 7 5.0
Total 140 100
Nb. As 4 separate reasons can be given for an application rejection, the theoretical total for the data held on 94 rejections can be 376. However, 7 of these 
rejections were due to ineligibility, and 2 applicants withdrew, so the theoretical maximum is 340. As not all VCSEs are given 4 rejection reasons, N here  
equals 140.
7.8 – Appendix H: Post-grant Award Support Needs
Table 7.7 – Post-grant Award Support Needs
Variable % N
Financial Performance 21.7% 85
Financial Control 12.0% 47
Market Potential 26.5% 104
Governance & Leadership 15.1% 59
Quality & Impact 24.7% 97
Total 100.0% 392
Nb. As 5 support needs were coded into the database, the theoretical total for the data held on 137 grant awards is 675 support needs. As not all VCSEs 
identified 5 support needs, N here equals 392.
7.9 – Appendix I: VCSE MIAA Scores
Table 7.8 – VCSE MIAA Scores at Time 1 and Time 2
MIAA Category
MIAA Time 1 MIAA Time 2
t
N Time 1 SD N Mean SD
MIAA Overall Score 37 64.3% 9.9% 37 69.7% 9.8% 9.83***
*** = p < .001. The t value is drawn from the paired-sample t-test to explore longitudinal changes in MIAA scores.
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7.10 – Appendix J: VCSE Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about your SE and describe your role?
a. Social mission?
b. Entrepreneur/CEO?
c. Legal and governance structure?
d. Future?
2. What are your main sources of income?
a. Sectors:
i. Private sector.
ii. Public sector.
iii. Donative.
b. Have those sources of income changed since you started up and if so how?
3. Why did you apply to the Big Potential programme?
4. What has been your experience of the Big Potential programme?
5. What was your knowledge of investment readiness prior to engaging with Big Potential?
a. How has this changed?
6. What do you see happening with your venture over the next 12 months?
a. Expansion?
b. Seek further investment?
c. Social impact?
7. How has the Big Potential programme changed your organisation?
8. Did you encounter any barriers/problems with the Big Potential programme?
9. What do you think are the main barriers to you seeking investment from the private sector or 
contracts from the public sector?
a. Has the Big Potential programme helped with any of this?
10. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
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7.11 – Appendix K: Provider Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about your organisation?
a. Social mission?
b. Experience/history?
2. Why did you become a provider for BP?
3. What has been your experience of the BIG Potential programme?
a. Mentoring and partner organisation?
b. Final grant applications?
c. Post-grant application?
4. What was your knowledge of the social investment sector like prior to becoming a Provider on  
BIG Potential?
a. How has this changed?
5. Did you encounter any barriers/problems with the BIG Potential programme?
a. What could be improved?
6. How do you believe that BP has helped the VCSEs that you have supported?
a. Investment readiness?
b. Business development?
c. Social impact?
7. What support have you provided to VCSEs during their applications?
a. What is most important area in your perception?
8. Can you tell me about a specific case study (if applicable)?
9. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add? 
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7.12 – Appendix L: Panel Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about yourself?
a. Professional experience.
b. Current role.
2. Why have you become a panel member for BP?
3. What has been your experience of the BIG Potential programme panel meetings?
a. Application quality?
b. Assessment?
c. Grant awardee updates?
4. Did you see any barriers/problems with the BIG Potential programme?
a. What could be improved?
5. How do you believe that BP has helped VCSEs?
a. Awardees?
b. Generally?
6. What do you think the impact of the BP is on the sector?
a. Business planning?
b. Investment readiness?
c. Social impact?
7. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
46
7.13 – Appendix M: Investor/Commissioner Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about yourself?
a. Professional experience.
b. Current role.
2. What is your perception of the UK social investment market/public services commissioning market?
3. What role do you see Big Potential having the UK SIM/PSCM?
4. Did you see any barriers/problems with the BIG Potential programme?
a. What could be improved?
5. How do you believe that BP benefits VCSEs?
a. Awardees?
b. Generally?
6. What do you think the impact of the BP is on the sector?
a. Business planning?
b. Investment/Contract readiness?
c. Social impact?
7. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
47
1. Brown, A. & Norman, W, (2011), Lighting 
the Touch-Paper: Growing the Social 
Investment Market in England, Boston 
Consulting Group & the Young Foundation, 
Report commissioned by Big Society Capital 
November 2011.
2. Ecorys, (October 2015), In Pursuit of 
Readiness: Evaluation of the Investment and 
Contract Readiness Fund, SIB & Cabinet 
Office Research Report, available online at 
https://www.sibgroup.org.uk/sites/default/
files/files/ICRF%20Evaluation.pdf. 
3. Feldman, M. S., Sköldberg, K., Brown, R. 
and Horner, D. (2004) ‘Making sense of 
stories: A rhetorical approach to narrative 
analysis,’ Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 14(2), pp. 147–70.
4. Field, A., (2009), Discovering Statistics 
using SPSS, 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, 
London.
5. 5. Gregory, D., Hill, K., Joy, I. & Keen, S., 
(2012), Investment Readiness in the UK, Big 
Lottery Fund, July 2012, London, available 
online at (www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/er_
invest_ready.pdf).
6. Lewis, R., (2010), Close to Parity: 
Challenging the voluntary sector to smash 
the glass ceiling, Clore Social Leadership 
Fellowship Paper, available online at  
http://www.cloresocialleadership.org.
uk/userfiles/documents/Research%20
reports/2010/Research,%20Rowena%20
Lewis,%20FINAL.pdf 
7. Moth, D., (June 2014), Email marketing 
benchmarks 2014: How do you stack up? 
Econsultancy Report – June 11th 2014, 
available online at https://econsultancy.
com/blog/64994-email-marketing-
benchmarks-2014-how-do-you-stack-up. 
8. NCVO, (2016), UK Civil Society Almanac 
2016? NCVO UK Civil Society Almanac, 
available online at https://data.ncvo.org.uk/
category/almanac/ 
9. Ronicle, J. & Fox, T, (2015), In Pursuit of 
Readiness: Evaluation of the Investment and 
Contract Readiness Fund, ICRF Evaluation 
Report October 2015, Ecorys, available 
online at http://www.sibgroup.org.uk/sites/
default/files/files/ICRF%20Evaluation.pdf 
10. Teasdale, S., McKay, S., Phillimore, J. & 
Teasdale, N., (2011), Exploring gender 
and social entrepreneurship: women’s 
leadership, employment and participation 
in the third sector and social enterprises, 
Voluntary Sector Review, 2(1), pp. 57-76.
8. References
Author: Dr Richard Hazenberg 
Institute for Social Innovation & Impact, University of Northampton  |  July 2018
call us on 020 3096 7900 
email enquiries@sibgroup.org.uk 
visit www.bigpotential.org.uk 
twitter @Big_PotentialSI
Social Investment Business 
CAN Mezzanine 
7-14 Great Dover Street 
London 
SE1 4YR
